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Abstract
We study the fiscal consequences of municipal mergers by making use of a large-
scale merger reform in the German federal state of Brandenburg. This reform, which
was implemented from 2001 to 2003, led to a substantial reduction in the number of
municipalities. Individual mergers were heterogeneous across a number of dimen-
sions, which allows us to contribute to the literature by exploring the consequences
of different types of mergers within the same institutional setting. Focusing in
particular on the distinction between compulsory and (semi-) voluntary mergers,
we implement a difference-in-difference design with panel data from 1995-2010 at
the level of post-merger municipalities. We find significant reductions in (adminis-
trative) expenditures after compulsory mergers. Voluntary mergers, on the other
hand, have no effect on expenditures. We also show that the effects of voluntary
and compulsory mergers vary according to further (secondary) characteristics of a
merger.
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1 Introduction
Many industrialized countries have embarked on large-scale municipal merger reforms
in the last few decades (Fox and Gurley, 2006). Policy makers typically initiated these
reforms in the belief that larger municipal units can exploit economies of scale in public
service provision and thereby reduce costs.1 Whether mergers really entail economies of
scale and lower expenditures, however, has not yet been conclusively answered. Some
studies suggest insignificant effects or even diseconomies of scale after mergers (Moisio
and Uusitalo, 2013; Lu¨chinger and Stutzer, 2002; Allers and Geertsema, 2014; Fritz,
2013), while others show substantial expenditure reductions (Blom-Hansen et al., 2014;
Reingewertz, 2012).
The ambiguity in literature is difficult to resolve because existing studies typically vary
simultaneously along two dimensions. First, they vary in the country, or more precisely
in the institutional setting, that is being studied. Second, studies vary according to the
type of the merger process, especially according to whether municipalities had some say in
whether and with whom to merge (voluntary mergers) or whether mergers were designed
and enforced by the central government (compulsory mergers). As each study typically
deals with only either compulsory or voluntary mergers, it is difficult to disentangle the
effects of the specific features of a merger reform from the institutional idiosyncrasies of
the setting.
In this paper, we revisit the question of how mergers affect municipal expenditures
relying on a sample of municipalities in the German State of Brandenburg over the period
1995-2010. Brandenburg merged 1319 municipalities into 266 larger units during the 2001-
2003 period in the context of a major merger reform, while leaving 155 municipalities
unaffected. This opens up a natural experiment with which we can identify the causal
effect of mergers on a number of municipal expenditure items using difference-in-difference
(DD) regressions.
1Other advantages to larger municipalities might be, for example, the provision of a wider range of
public services and goods, the internalization of externalities (Oates, 1972) as well as a greater influence
over policies implemented by higher tiers of government (Fox and Gurley, 2006).
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One notable advantage of our setting over the existing quasi-experimental literature is
that the merger reform in Brandenburg encompassed various types of mergers, and in-
cluded in particular both voluntary and compulsory mergers. More specifically, the state
government of Brandenburg decided in late 2000 to reduce the number of municipalities.
Following this decision, municipalities were allowed to choose when and with whom to
merge until late 2003. In this sense, mergers were voluntary during this initial period.
In late 2003, however, the state government passed a law that enforced mergers of those
municipalities that were supposed to merge but had not yet done so, bringing the merger
reform to a close.2 Besides the voluntary vs. compulsory distinction, the mergers during
the reform were also heterogeneous along various other dimensions: e. g. in the size of
the affected population, in the number of participating municipalities, and in whether
mergers were annexations or fusions. That mergers with different characteristics take
place within a single reform helps us to understand in detail how the design of a merger
determines its fiscal consequences. As indicated, the previous literature either relies ex-
clusively on big bang type of reforms where municipalities were merged according to the
central government’s design at the same date or on entirely voluntary mergers that take
place in a piecemeal fashion.3
Overall, our results indicate that mergers result in economies of scale for administrative
expenditures: we observe a negative and statistically significant effect on this expendi-
ture category. On the other hand, we do not identify any significant average effects on
total, staff, and current expenditures. However, further analysis reveals significant het-
erogeneity across different types of mergers. First, we find that the administrative cost
savings are mostly due to compulsory mergers. Second, we also observe large negative,
albeit insignificant, effects of compulsory mergers on total and current expenditures; for
voluntary mergers, on the other hand, our estimates are statistically insignificant and
2We discuss the selection criteria for (compulsory) mergers further below.
3Compulsory mergers are analyzed in Reingewertz (2012) for Israel and Blom-Hansen et al. (2014)
for Denmark. In contrast, Lu¨chinger and Stutzer (2002)), Moisio and Uusitalo (2013) and Allers and
Geertsema (2014) study exclusively voluntary mergers in Switzerland, Finland and the Netherlands,
respectively.
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small in magnitude.4 Third, we find that the effect of voluntary and compulsory merg-
ers varies depending on additional characteristics of a merger: voluntary and, to some
extent, compulsory mergers are more effective in reducing costs when more inhabitants
are affected; both voluntary and compulsory mergers reduce expenditures more when a
larger number of municipalities are involved; annexations tend to reduce costs more than
fusions and mixed mergers (which consist of both annexations and fusions).
There are some concerns regarding the validity of the DD design given the character-
istics of our setting. Most importantly, the state government did not randomly choose
municipalities for mergers. Municipalities may have been chosen for mergers based on ex-
pected future fiscal developments. While such expected developments were officially not
part of the selection criteria for mergers set out by the state government (the criteria did
not refer to any fiscal variables), it is nevertheless possible that the state government im-
plicitly took municipal fiscal trajectories into account. A related concern is self-selection
into voluntary mergers. It is possible that those municipalities which decided to merge
voluntarily during the reform period expected worse fiscal developments. To address
these concerns regarding selection, we show that pre-treatment trends in treatment and
control municipalities were reasonably similar and that the main results remain robust
if we control for observable time-varying characteristics of municipalities.5 Another im-
portant concern is possible common pool incentives that may have led to expansions in
expenditures in the immediate pre-merger period. We address this issue in robustness
tests and show that the results remain robust.6
4Note that an alternative interpretation of the reduced form effects is that there were cuts in municipal
services after compulsory mergers, which then led to declining expenditures. While it would be preferable
to explore the evolution of municipal services explicitly by relating proxies for service quantity and quality
to mergers, it is difficult to measure quantity or quality of local services. Service quantity is hard to
measure comprehensively as municipal tasks are manifold and often carried out by various administrative
units. For the same reason, it is difficult to evaluate changes in service quality accurately. Overall,
however, it is unlikely that the mergers led to significant cuts in services as the state government did not
redistribute (new) tasks or gave guidelines to decrease service provision. Similarly, it is implausible that
municipalities would deliberately use the opportunity offered by mergers to cut services to their citizens.
5We also explore the robustness of the results regarding selection in further robustness tests reported
in the appendix; see Table A.7.
6Yet another concern is that an increasing number of municipalities drops successively from the sam-
ple, resulting in an unbalanced panel. The reason is that municipalities in Brandenburg started to switch
from the cameralistic accounting system to a new accounting system (Doppik – double bookkeeping) in
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We are one of the first studies to provide evidence on how voluntary versus compulsory
municipal mergers affect economies of scale and corresponding fiscal outcomes within
the same institutional framework.7 Moreover, this paper adds to a relatively small quasi-
experimental empirical literature on how fiscal variables evolve after mergers.8 Allers and
Geertsema (2014), Moisio and Uusitalo (2013), and Lu¨chinger and Stutzer (2002) analyze
voluntary municipal mergers in the Netherlands, Finland, and Switzerland, respectively.
These studies find little evidence that economies of scale increase due to mergers. The
results for compulsory mergers, as for example in Denmark or Israel, seem to be different.
Specifically, Blom-Hansen et al. (2014) and Hansen et al. (2014) find for a Danish merger
reform in 2007 that fiscal outcomes improve. Reingewertz (2012) finds that the Israeli
merger reform of 2003 reduced total expenditures by about 8% in the amalgamated
municipalities compared to non-amalgamated municipalities. As indicated above, our
results confirm that it is the compulsory nature of the merger process itself rather than
other institutional peculiarities that results in cost savings following mergers. By the
same token, voluntary mergers tend to be less effective in reducing public expenditures.
Fritz (2013) is the only previous quasi-experimental study that explores the fiscal effects
of mergers with German data.9 He focuses on mergers in the West German state of
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg in 1975 and finds that mergers increase municipal debt and total
expenditures. He does, however, not explore whether expenditure effects differ between
2007. Not all municipalities switched immediately (the switch was staggered); but by 2010 all munici-
palities had switched to the new system. As data from the old and the new accounting system are not
comparable, we drop a municipality from the sample when it switches to the new system. The timing of
the switch to the new accounting system, however, was not systematically related to the merger reform.
A robustness test with a balanced sample reported in the appendix confirms the main results (Table
A.5).
7Hanes and Wikstro¨m (2010) exploit a large scale Swedish merger reform in the 1950s to compare the
outcomes of voluntary and compulsory mergers for local population and income growth. The authors find
that voluntary mergers perform better with respect to both measures compared to compulsory mergers.
However, this contradicts the findings of stronger population growth for less voluntary mergers of Kauder
(2014) for West German municipal mergers. However, both papers do not focus on expenditure effects
of municipal mergers.
8A related literature studies how fiscal variables evolve before mergers, for example Jordahl and
Liang (2010), Hinnerich (2009), Nakazawa (2013), Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2015), Hansen (2014) and
Blom-Hansen (2010).
9Kauder (2014) also studies German municipal mergers, but this study focuses on population growth
effects of incorporating municipalities into larger cities. He finds that incorporated municipalities grow
faster than non-incorporated municipalities.
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voluntary and forced mergers.10 Another related paper, studying the merger reform
Brandenburg is Bruns et al. (2015). The authors find that voluntary mergers took place
according to political considerations but do not address fiscal effects of municipal mergers.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the
theoretical link between municipal mergers and scale economies. Section 3 provides some
institutional details about local public finance in Germany and the merger reform in
Brandenburg. We discuss the data in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss the empirical
approach. Section 6 collects the results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Municipal mergers, scale economies, and common
pool problems
2.1 Economies of scale and municipal mergers
The main motive for municipal mergers is that increasing the size of municipalities might
entail cost reductions via economies of scale. Larger municipalities might be able to
produce a given output with lower average unit costs. Alternatively, lower service levels
might result in lower expenditures even if no scale economies are achieved. However,
higher cost efficiency should entail lower spending for given services and vice versa.
Scale economies can emerge after mergers for several reasons. Average costs of produc-
tion may decline for a given level of municipal services due to more specialization in larger
municipalities. That is, it is plausible that small municipalities are not able to efficiently
provide certain public goods because of a lack of professionalization. In addition, larger
municipalities have more bargaining power vis-a`-vis externals (for e.g. private suppliers
of inputs) and can reduce purchasing prices. Duplication of certain services can also be
avoided, which reduces fixed expenditures at given service levels. However, municipal
10Note that there is also a descriptive literature on fiscal outcomes of mergers such as Blume and
Blume (2007) for Germany, Gordon and Knight (2008) for school districts in the US as well as Nelson
(1992) and Hanes (2015) for municipalities in Sweden.
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mergers may not lead to observable cost reductions even in the presence of economies
of scale if, for example, rigid labor contracts prevent cost reductions by layoffs or wage
reductions.
Even though mergers are often initiated to harvest economies of scale, they may in
fact entail diseconomies. Costs per residents may be U-shaped; if mergers result in mu-
nicipalities that are sub-optimally large, costs might increase due to congestion (Reiter
and Weichenrieder, 1997).11 In addition, voters may voice demands for new public goods
once a municipality surpasses a certain size, which would call for a bigger, more diver-
sified, and specialized administration (Brecht, 1932). Municipal size may also increase
informational asymmetries between public officials on the local level which might lead to
a socially non-optimal service provision. First, bureaucrats may find it easier to expand
their budgets above an efficient level and increase slack as politicians and voters are less
able to control the activities of the administration (Niskanen, 1968). Second, politicians,
too, may free-ride on their informational advantage over their voters and try to capture
rents (Oates, 2005).
2.2 Fiscal effects across types of mergers
While the previous discussion applies to mergers in general, actual mergers vary across a
number of dimensions, and these specific characteristics may have distinctive effects on
fiscal outcomes.
Voluntary versus compulsory mergers Voluntary agreements should, in theory,
be more efficient than compulsory ones as both partners must consider the merger as
beneficial. However, it is possible that political transaction costs might be sufficiently
large to prevent many economically efficient mergers if they are to be decided voluntarily
(Sørensen, 2006). Theoretical work following Alesina and Spolaore (1997) establishes a
11Whether the costs of service provision are U-shaped is unclear, see Fox and Gurley (2006) for a
review.
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trade-off between economies of scale and preference heterogeneity when deciding on the
size of a political jurisdiction.12 Consequently, if municipalities can voluntarily decide on
mergers, they may choose a less than optimal jurisdiction size (Weese, 2015).
Moreover, voluntary mergers may reduce expenditures less than compulsory ones if
local politicians are not entirely benevolent and have a preference for large public sectors
for self-serving reasons (Edwards and Keen, 1996). Politicians might then strategically
choose amalgamation partners in order to minimize electoral competition in the local
council of the future amalgam (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2010; Hyytinen et al., 2014). That is,
if municipalities are allowed to choose with whom to merge, they may deliberately merge
with those partners that would allow them to extract higher rents by e. g. maintaining
current spending levels. With compulsory mergers, as they are designed and enforced by
the higher-level governments, such strategic partnerships are less likely.
Finally, voluntary mergers may also be less effective because those municipalities that
voluntarily agree to merge may have already cooperated and pooled resources in the pre-
merger period. Consequently, the potential for cost savings by voluntary mergers may be
lower (Saarimaa and Tukiainen, 2014).
Other sources of heterogeneity across mergers Other characteristics of merg-
ers may also affect fiscal outcomes, e. g. the size of the affected population. On the one
hand, a larger affected population implies a bigger potential for cost savings if population
size is sub-optimally low. On the other hand, transition costs might be higher if more
inhabitants are involved or if congestion costs are larger than any cost savings. Similarly,
the number of affected municipalities may be important for the fiscal consequences of
a merger. Finally, note that mergers vary by whether they are annexations or fusions.
Formally, annexations are mergers where the municipal code of one municipality is com-
pletely adopted by the other municipalities involved in the merger. Fusions are mergers
where a new code is being adopted by the post-merger municipality. In practice, there
12A vast empirical literature on the determinants of (voluntary) mergers finds that they are more likely
if expected fiscal gains are high and heterogeneity between potential merger partners is low, notably in
fiscal (Gordon and Knight, 2009) or political terms (Bruns et al., 2015).
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is a dominant partner in annexations while fusions are mergers between equals. Overall,
annexations could be either more or less effective than fusions (or “mixed” mergers that
comprise both annexations and fusions). On the one hand, an annexing municipality
will tend to be substantially larger and thus already have a sophisticated administration,
allowing the smaller partners to reduce their administrations. On the other hand, annex-
ations may, for political reasons, involve some concessions of the annexing municipality to
the smaller partners. In particular, they may be permitted to temporarily retain some of
administrative offices or to increase service provision to the (higher) level of the annexing
partner.
2.3 Common pool problems in pre-merger budgets
Typically, policy makers are interested in economies of scale that unfold in the aftermath
of mergers. However, opportunistic pre-merger behavior may lower the intended post-
merger economic benefits and therefore needs to be considered, even if we are primarily
interested in the post-reform effects of mergers in this paper. In anticipation of the merger,
opportunistic politicians might attempt to free-ride on the debt or the tax base of the
expected post-reform municipality, resulting in a pre-merger common pool problem.
There is some evidence, primarily from Nordic countries, that municipalities engage in
such opportunistic pre-merger behavior, especially in the year before the merger. Oppor-
tunistic behavior has been previously documented for expenditures (Hansen, 2014), debt,
and assets (Jordahl and Liang, 2010; Hinnerich, 2009; Saarimaa and Tukiainen, 2015), or
budget overruns (Blom-Hansen, 2010). There is also evidence for common pool problems
prior to municipal mergers for Japanese municipalities (Nakazawa, 2013).
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3 Institutional background
3.1 Local governance structure in Germany
The units of analysis in this paper are municipalities in the East German federal state
of Brandenburg.13 Article 28 II of the German constitution (Grundgesetz ) guarantees
all municipalities the right to run their own affairs. No further details are codified, and
hence municipalities duties are specified by state-level legislation.
In practice, municipalities in all states are responsible for the provision of a broad range
of public goods and services. In administrative terms, municipal tasks can be divided
into three categories: voluntary tasks (freiwillige Selbstverwaltungsaufgaben), own com-
pulsory tasks (pflichtige Selbstverwaltungsaufgaben), and transferred compulsory tasks
(u¨bertragene Selbstverwaltungsaufgaben). The degree of discretion municipalities have
over these type of tasks decreases successively. Transferred compulsory tasks are, in fact,
responsibilities of the state tier, but have been transferred by the state governments to
the municipal tier for implementation. Consequently, municipalities have no discretion
on whether and how to fulfill these tasks. Examples for transferred compulsory tasks is
the guaranteeing of public order (Ordnungsverwaltung). Own compulsory tasks are tasks
that municipalities must fulfill, but they have discretion about how to fulfill them. For
example, child care is an own compulsory task. Municipalities have to guarantee some
minimum amount and quality of child care, but can expand child care facilities above
these minimum requirements at their discretion. Finally, voluntary tasks are entirely
under the discretion of municipalities. They can decide to not engage in in these tasks
at all or to invest significant resources. An example for voluntary tasks is the provision
of cultural venues, e. g. theaters and museums. Various social serves are also important
voluntary tasks, for example care for the old or the poor.14
13Germany has a complex federal structure of governance, but consists mainly of three governmental
tiers. In addition to the national government, there were 16 federal states and 11,292 municipalities in
2011 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013).
14The share of local government expenditures in GDP in Germany according to the OECD was about
7% in 2014, which is lower than in e. g. Nordic countries (which ostensibly have the largest local
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Besides these significant responsibilities at the expenditure side of the budget, Ger-
man municipalities also have considerable revenue autonomy, including revenue sources
like user charges, several taxes like the trade tax (Gewerbesteuer) or property taxes
(Grundsteuer) as well as remunerations for benefits and services (Zimmermann, 1999).
In summary, municipalities in Germany are important and multipurpose economic ac-
tors.15
3.2 Municipal merger reform in Brandenburg
3.2.1 Reasons, aims and process of the reform
In order to achieve a more efficient local government structure, many West-German states
implemented large-scale merger reforms in the 1960s and 1970s. No comparable reforms
were enacted in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as the country was highly
unitary. Therefore, subnational governments, and in particular the municipalities, were
presumably considered to be too unimportant to warrant the effort of large-scale merger
reforms. After German reunification, however, the administrative structure of West-
Germany was adopted by the newly formed Eastern States and municipalities became
important pillars of public administration. Given the absence of merger reforms, how-
ever, Eastern municipalities tended to be very small. Therefore, attempts were made to
reduce the number and increase the size of municipalities in the Eastern States (Landtag
Brandenburg, 2012).
In Brandenburg, the Ministry of Interior is in charge of local governments. The min-
istry’s policy was always supportive to mergers, both on the municipality and district
level. Despite the installation of municipal associations in 1992 and the reduction of
rural districts in 1993 from 38 to 14, state officials continued to diagnose a chronic lack of
administrative capacity and efficiency (Landtag Brandenburg, 2012). In particular, 58.2%
of the municipalities in Brandenburg had less than 500 residents, and especially these very
government sector in the OECD), but comparable to many other OECD countries (e. g. Austria, Belgium,
Canada). Also, the share local expenditure in total government expenditure was about 17% in 2014.
15For a more comprehensive review of the German federal system, see Zimmermann (1999).
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small rural municipalities have been perceived to fulfill their public service obligations
neither sufficiently nor efficiently (Ministerium des Innern Brandenburg, 2011).
For such small municipalities, municipal mergers were seen as an instrument to achieve
cost savings.16 Mergers were expected, in particular, to achieve higher efficiency in terms
of fiscal and administrative capacities (Landtag Brandenburg, 2000).17 Immediately af-
ter the state elections at the end of 1999, the new state government therefore agreed
on a comprehensive merger reform. Subsequently, the state parliament instructed the
government to suggest a concept for a reform by mid-2000. The state government then
proposed a concept called “guidelines for the development of rural structures” (Leitlinien
der Landesregierung fu¨r die Entwicklung der Gemeindestruktur im Land Brandenburg) in
July 2000, which was passed in September 2000 by the state parliament.18
The guidelines stipulated that after the reform, municipalities should have no less than
5000 inhabitants. In cases where it was not possible to create new independent munici-
palities, existing municipalities were expected to organize within a municipal association.
In these cases, individual municipalities belonging to an association should not have less
than 500 inhabitants. Associations themselves should have no less than 5000 inhabitants
and encompass 3 to 6 municipalities. The travel distance to the seat of the administration
of the association should also not be larger than 20 km. The guidelines also spelled out
further criteria, for example that district and existing municipal association boundaries
should be respected in a municipal merger, i. e. mergers across districts or associations
were discouraged, but exceptions were possible under certain conditions (Landtag Bran-
denburg, 2000).
16An unsuccessful initiative in support of voluntary mergers was launched in the beginning of 1998
(Landtag Brandenburg, 1998). The few resulting voluntary mergers by this act and their effects are
addressed in the robustness checks of Section 6. Particularly, we obtain similar results regardless of
whether the prior mergers are considered in the analysis or not.
17Another aim of the reform was to ensure that enough candidates would be available to contest
elections for local government positions (Ministerium des Innern Brandenburg, 2001). Also, larger local
units were seen as an instrument of improved regional planning and a more professional public service
provision.
18The timeline of the reform is sketched in Figure A.1 in the appendix.
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Following the publishing of the guidelines, a voluntary merger phase was initiated from
the beginning of 200119 until March 2002. Municipalities that merged voluntarily could
chose with whom and when to merge within the criteria of the reform guidelines. Vol-
untary mergers took place in the form of a contract between the merging municipalities,
which had to be accepted by the local councils of all involved municipalities (and for
municipality with fewer than 5000 inhabitants additionally by a referendum). All as-
sets, debts and administrative staff of amalgamating pre-reform municipalities were to
be taken over by the respective post-reform municipality.
Voluntary mergers, even if accepted by the council (and possibly by a referendum),
were subject to the final approval of the state interior ministry. Approval was generally
conditioned on whether the newly created municipalities fulfilled the criteria spelled out
in the guidelines.20 To support voluntary mergers, a “municipal reform law” (Gemein-
dereformgesetz ) was passed in March 2001 (Ministerium des Innern Brandenburg, 2001).
The latter provided a financial incentive scheme for municipal mergers within the vol-
untary time period with a maximum premium of 2.5 million Euros per newly created
municipality from the state government. In general, however, these amalgamation grants
only made up a relatively small fraction of total expenditures.21
On March 2003, the state government passed six “laws of reorganization” (Neugliederungs-
gesetze) to finally complete all those mergers that did not fulfill the selection criteria of
the guidelines (Landtag Brandenburg, 2003). The compulsory mergers hence took place
on the basis of laws rather than contracts. While the laws on compulsory mergers were
drafted, municipalities could still agree on voluntary mergers. If the mergers were ad-
missible under the guidelines, they were approved and the draft of the law was changed
accordingly. The remaining mergers became effective by 26th October 2003 and the
municipal merger reform was finally put to an end.
19In December 2000 there was already a merger involving the new municipality Teichland.
20 However, according to the state government, voluntary mergers could be denied if, for example, a
particular merger would make it impossible for other municipalities to fulfill the guidelines after their
mergers, or if there were “obviously” better partners for mergers available.
21Specifically, amalgamation grants only made up about 6 to 7 percent of total expenditures even
among those municipalities that received such grants.
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In general, municipalities that merged during the merger reform did not satisfy the
criteria in the guidelines while those that remained intact did. Nevertheless, the reform
and its implementation were extremely controversial. Legal challenges against the com-
pulsory mergers were mounted at the end of reform, resulting in 255 cases at the state’s
constitutional court. The main argument of the complaints were based on the municipal
right for local autonomy. However, except for two formal mistakes, no revisions to the
reform were made until the end of the lawsuits in 2006 (Verfassungsgericht Brandenburg
, 2006).
The merger reform reduced the number of municipalities substantially, from 1474 (end
of year 2000) down to 421 in 2004.22 Mergers occurred also before the reform23, but the
reform increased the numbers of completed mergers drastically (Figure 1). The number
of municipalities remained largely stable after the end of the reform.24 During the reform,
1319 municipalities merged to 266 larger units, with the merged units encompassing from
2 up to 22 pre-reform municipalities. 103 of these mergers were compulsory while 163
were voluntary. 155 municipalities were left unaffected. The share of small jurisdictions
with less than 500 inhabitants declined from 58.2% in 1999 to 1.4% of all municipalities
in 2004. Figure A.2 in the appendix reports maps of pre- and post-reform municipal
boundaries (i. e. in 1999 and 2005).
22In fact, there were 438 municipalities at the end of 2003 which is formally the terminal year of the
reform. However, some further boundary changes took place in 2004, which results our sample of 421
post-merger municipalities. In the regressions, we drop twelve more municipalities from the sample for
various reasons (see below).
23Note that we classify municipalities that merged before the merger reform but did not experience
a merger during the reform as control units in the empirical analysis below. This may cause us to
under-estimate the treatment effect of mergers. However, we show in a robustness test (Table A.6) that
dropping municipalities that had mergers between 1990 and 2000 from the sample does not affect the
main results.
24Only two further mergers took place after the end of the reform, i.e. in 2009 and 2014 (Amt fu¨r
Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2013).
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4 Data
4.1 Variables
Table A.1 in the appendix describes all outcome and explanatory variables used in the sub-
sequent analysis. For expenditures as well as for several control variables, we use adminis-
trative data from the state statistical office (Statistisches Landesamt Berlin-Brandenburg,
SBB). All budget figures are based on yearly realized municipal accounts. Monetary units
are deflated by the consumer price index and are expressed in constant Euros with the
base year 2010.
4.2 Units of observation
We use a panel of municipalities of the federal state Brandenburg for the years 1995–2010.
All variables for these municipalities have been aggregate to post-reform boundaries by
the state statistical office.25 Therefore, budgetary outcomes for merged units before the
treatment are the sum of all respective pre-reform municipalities. The final analysis cov-
ers 257 post-reform municipalities that were part of municipal mergers (treatment group)
and 152 municipalities that were unaffected from boundary changes (control group). This
sample (409 municipalities) is smaller than the full sample of 421 post-reform municipal-
ities (266 merged and 155 non-merged) since we drop twelve municipalities for various
reasons.26
25Thus, we follow much the previous literature which uses data aggregated to post-reform boundaries,
for e.g. Reingewertz (2012).
26First, the district-free (kreisfrei) cities Frankfurt/Oder, Potsdam, Brandenburg an der Havel and
Cottbus have a different administrative status than other municipalities. As their status as district-free
suggests, they carry out both municipal and district-related tasks. Thus, one cannot compare district-
free with district-affiliated municipalities and we exclude the four district free cities from the sample. We
also drop six municipalities which experience boundary changes after the official reform end in October
2003: Ko¨nigs-Wusterhausen, Heiligengrabe, Neuhausen/Spree, Spremberg, Bad Freienwalde and Welzow
(LDS, 2005). Finally, the municipalities of Hohensaaten and Haidemu¨hl are excluded as no budgetary
data at the level of the 2012 boundaries is available.
14
4.3 Descriptive statistics on municipal mergers
We distinguish in the subsequent analysis between three types of post-merger municipali-
ties: those that were not merged, those that were merged compulsorily, and municipalities
that merged voluntarily. While it is straightforward to distinguish between merged and
non-merged municipalities, it is less clear how to distinguish between compulsorily and
voluntarily merged municipalities. As the post-merger municipalities were typically cre-
ated by amalgamating more than two municipalities, some experienced both voluntary
and compulsory mergers. We define a post-merger municipality as part of a compul-
sory merger if at least one merger happened compulsorily, even if this municipality also
experienced a number of voluntarily mergers.27
Table 1 collects summary statistics on the outcome and control variables. As could
already be inferred from our description of the merger process above, these statistics con-
firm that the majority of post-merger municipalities in our sample were created through
amalgamations – about 63 percent. Also, about 40% of post-merger municipalities were
created through entirely voluntary mergers while about 23% municipalities had at least
one compulsory merger.
Table 2 compares characteristics of non-merged against merged municipalities (Panel
A) and of voluntarily against compulsorily merged municipalities (Panel B) in 2000, the
year before the start of the merger reform. Clearly, these groups are different across
a range of characteristics even as the data is consolidated to post-merger units. For
example, the municipalities that were eventually merged have, when aggregated to the
post-merger boundaries, higher total, administrative, and current expenditures than non-
merged municipalities. On the other hand, there are no differences in population size,
which, however, is to some extent expected given that it was an explicit goal of the merger
reform to increase the size of the merged municipalities.
27We explore in Table A.8 in the appendix whether the share of actually compulsorily mergers within
a merger defined as compulsory matters for fiscal outcomes. The results are similar to our baseline
findings. Another strategy to explore the robustness of the results to this issue is to drop municipalities
that underwent multiple mergers. We implement this strategy in Table A.9 in the appendix and find
that the results remain largely robust.
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We also observe significant differences in characteristics between municipalities that un-
derwent compulsory and voluntary mergers. For example, municipalities that underwent
compulsory mergers had generally higher expenditures. As discussed above, this may
suggest that municipalities that merged voluntarily already cooperated in the pre-merger
period, allowing them to have somewhat lower expenditures already in the pre-merger
period. Similarly, post-merger population size of municipalities with compulsory mergers
is significantly higher than that of voluntary mergers, which may indicate that these mu-
nicipalities strategically choose partners that would help them to surpass some minimum
threshold in order to avoid a compulsory merger.
5 Empirical framework
As the three groups of (voluntarily, compulsorily and non-merged) municipalities have
significantly different pre-merger characteristics, we implement a difference-in-differences
(DD) design in a regression framework to consistently estimate the expenditure effects
of mergers. The DD design accounts for all time-invariant characteristics of municipal-
ities that could be correlated with whether a municipality underwent a (voluntary or
compulsory) merger. More specifically, we estimate the following model:
yit = αi + γt + βAmalgamationit + θXit + it (1)
where yit is one of four expenditure items for municipality i and year t (total expenditures,
staff expenditures, administrative expenditures, and current expenditures) in Euros per
capita.
The treatment indicator is defined as Amalgamation = (Amalg ∗ Post), i. e. it is an
interaction variable between a dummy indicating amalgamated municipalities, Amalg,
and a dummy indicating the post-merger period, Post. The dummy Amalg is set to 1
for all municipalities which experienced a merger during the reform. The dummy Post
is set to 1 in the year in which the last merger in the context of the merger reform had
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been completed and to 0 for all the years before.28 That is, assume municipalities A and
B merge in 2001, creating municipality AB. In 2003, AB then merges with C, creating
ABC. The Post dummy is 1 only after 2003.29
Moreover, we control for all time-invariant characteristics of a given municipality by
including municipality-specific fixed effects αi and common time effects by accounting for
year-specific effects γt. We also control in some specifications for a vector of covariates X.
The covariates cover fiscal, demographic, and political characteristics of municipalities.
Specifically, to account for demographic factors we include the population, population
squared, population density, and the share of old in a municipality; to account for fiscal
and economic factors, we include the amount of rule-based grants per capita, the amount
income tax revenues per capita30, and the amount of amalgamation grants, i. e. grants
allocated to municipalities that merged voluntarily.31 Finally, to account for political
factors, we include the share of left-wing parties in the local council.32 it denotes the
error term. To account for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, we always report
results based on robust and clustered standard errors. Standard errors are clustered at
the municipal level.
As the DD design includes municipality-specific fixed effects and thus accounts for
time-invariant municipal characteristics, the main identifying assumption is that treated
and control municipalities would have had parallel trends in expenditures in the absence
of treatment (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). This assumption can be validated by explor-
ing pre-treatment expenditure trends in the three groups of municipalities (non-merged,
28Note that, as mentioned in footnote 19, one municipality, Teichland, already merged at the end
of December 2000. As this merger happened in December (and also for simplicity), we set for this
municipality the treatment dummy to 1 from 2001 onwards rather than from 2000.
29However, we show in a robustness test in Table A.4 that setting the Post dummy to 1 after the first
merger does not substantively change the results.
30Municipalities are entitled to a fixed fraction of all income tax revenues collected within their ad-
ministrative boundaries. As the income tax rate is constant throughout the federation (municipalities
have no autonomy to change rates or bases), the municipal income tax share is entirely determined by
the value of the base, which will evolve according to economic conditions.
31Note that amalgamation grants were paid also for the (voluntary) mergers that happened before
and after the merger reform. We neglect these pre- and post-reform grants; i. e. we only consider those
grants that were paid during the reform in the regressions.
32These variables are described in more detail in Table A.1.
17
voluntarily merged, compulsorily merged). If the three groups had experienced similar
trends in the pre-merger period, it is plausible that expenditures would have continued
to evolve in a parallel fashion in the post-treatment period in the absence of mergers.33
Figure 2 shows the average development of the four expenditures items in the three
groups. Note that the two vertical lines indicate the starting date and the terminal
date of the merger reform in the years 2001 and 2003, respectively. Trends in the pre-
merger period are largely parallel for staff and administrative expenditures. For total
expenditures, trends are also largely similar with the exception that in one year, 1998,
expenditures increase in compulsorily merged municipalities while they decline in non-
merged and voluntarily merged municipalities.
Similarly, pre-merger trends for current expenditures are roughly identical with the
exception that expenditures decline in 1997 in non-merged and voluntarily merged mu-
nicipalities while they increase in compulsorily merged municipalities. While these one-
time divergences arguably do not invalidate the common trends assumptions, we include
further below the set of time-variant covariates mentioned above to account for such
divergences across the three groups. Figure A.3 in the appendix indicates that these
time-varying covariates account reasonably well for such one-time divergences. That is,
when we plot the residuals from a regression of the four expenditure categories on the
covariates over time, we find for all of them essentially parallel trends across the entire
pre-treatment period.
33We also report in the appendix further robustness test that explore the issue of selection. Specifically,
Table A.7 reports regressions with only municipalities that underwent mergers included in the sample.
Identification in these regressions relies on the timing of mergers and is reasonably robust to violations
of the parallel trends assumption. The results confirm the baseline findings.
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6 Results
6.1 Graphical evidence
To gain a first impression of the effect of mergers, we illustrate graphically how the
outcome variables have evolved over the period 1995–2010. Again, we rely on Figure 2,
which, as discussed, traces mean total, staff, administrative, and current expenditures
per capita in treatment and control municipalities over time.
First, the plots show that mean total expenditures for compulsorily merged municipali-
ties have been consistently higher than for their non-merged counterparts. Municipalities
that underwent voluntary mergers also had on average higher expenditures than non-
merged municipalities, except in one year. Overall, this suggests that smaller adminis-
trative units had higher costs, presumably because they were unable to fully exploit scale
economies. This gap between municipalities that merged compulsorily and non-merged
municipalities has lowered immediately after the reform. In particular, expenditures of
compulsorily merged municipalities drop more sharply than those of non-merged munic-
ipalities from 2001 to 2003. The decline in the gap remains for the first few post-merger
years.
In the very long-run, we observe that the gap between compulsorily merged and non-
merged municipalities starts to increase again. This, however, is plausible because mu-
nicipalities successively drop from our sample due to the switch to the new accounting
system. Thus, the averages in the later periods are calculated for somewhat different
groups of municipalities than in the earlier post-merger period and thus not entirely
comparable. Overall, the graphical evidence suggests that the compulsory mergers led
to cost savings. For municipalities that merged voluntarily, the gap to non-merged mu-
nicipalities does not narrow substantively between 2001 and 2003; and there is also no
evidence for cost savings in the long-run.
Note also that some increase in expenditures in voluntarily and compulsorily merged
municipalities is observable in the early part of the merger reform (even as there is also
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an increase in non-merged municipalities). This may be, as discussed in Section 2.3, due
to attempts by municipalities selected for mergers to exploit the post-merger common
pool by expanding expenditures in the pre-merger period. Yet, this observation does not
invalidate our DD design, as any divergences in trends in the post-2000 period can be
related to the merger reform. However, it suggests that such pre-merger effects should
be accounted for in the empirical design. We explore this issue in a robustness test.
6.2 Expenditure effects of generic mergers
We report, as a benchmark, in this section the regression results for the four expenditure
categories while not differentiating according to the type of merger. Specifically, Table 3
collects the results of estimating Equation 1. We estimate regressions with and without
the time-varying covariates mentioned above. Some of these control variables are arguably
not exogenous, but it would nonetheless be reassuring if the results for the treatment
variable remains unaffected.
The estimates imply that merged municipalities witness a significant decline in admin-
istrative expenditures in the post-merger period, about 10 to 12 Euros per capita. Other
expenditure items are seemingly not affected by mergers. Overall, these results suggest
that generic mergers entail significant economies of scale for administrative expenditures
but not for other expenditure items. To evaluate the size of the effect, compare the es-
timates to average administrative expenditures per capita during the sample period as
reported in Table 1. Accordingly, a merger would reduce administrative expenditures
by about 8 to 10% of mean administrative expenditures or by about 1% of mean total
expenditures. However, as indicated above the average treatment effects may mask sig-
nificant heterogeneity according to the type of merger. In the following, we thus explore
heterogeneity across various dimensions.
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6.3 Voluntary vs. compulsory mergers
Much of the previous literature indicates that whether a merger is voluntary or compul-
sory matters for how it will affect fiscal outcomes. However, the available evidence on
compulsory and voluntary mergers is from different countries, and it is unclear whether
any differences in fiscal outcomes are due to country-specific institutional features or due
to inherent differences between compulsory and voluntary mergers. One advantage of our
setting is that we can explore within the same institutional context whether voluntary
and compulsory mergers have different treatment effects.
In Table 4, therefore, we report regression results from a variant of Equation 1 where we
estimate separate treatment effects for voluntary and compulsory mergers. Note first that
we obtain significant treatment effects on administrative expenditures only for compul-
sory mergers. Specifically, administrative expenditures decline significantly by around 23
to 25 Euros per capita after a compulsory merger, while there is no decline for voluntary
mergers; the coefficient estimate is neither statistically nor in magnitude distinguishable
from 0. Accordingly, compulsory mergers may reduce administrative expenditures by
about 20% of mean administrative expenditures or by about 1.7% of mean total expen-
ditures.
Second, we also observe large negative estimates for compulsory mergers on total and
current expenditures. For example, total expenditures decline by 75 Euros per capita
according to Model (II) and current expenditures by 37 Euros per capita according to
Model (VIII). While these estimates are insignificant, their magnitude indicates that
compulsory mergers tend to have a negative effect on total and current expenditures.
When compared to average total and compulsory expenditures as reported in Table 1,
the estimate imply that compulsory mergers reduce total expenditures by about 5% and
current expenditures by about 3 to 4%. As total and current expenditures are larger
expenditure categories than administrative expenditures, these small relative reductions
nonetheless imply larger absolute cost savings than for administrative expenditures. One
expenditure item where we do not see even small effects for compulsory merger are staff
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expenditures, which suggests that this expenditure item is highly persistent. This is
plausible as public sector labor contracts are difficult if not practically impossible to
terminate.34
6.4 Exploiting the pre-merger common pool
One concern with the previous results is that municipalities may expand expenditures
before the mergers in order to exploit the post-merger common pool. That is, any debt
accumulated by the pre-merger municipalities has to be repaid by the post-merger munic-
ipality, and thus in part by the other municipalities that were part of a merger (Hinnerich,
2009; Saarimaa and Tukiainen, 2015). Consequently, the decline in expenditures after
compulsory mergers may be simply a return to the norm rather than indicative of cost
savings. Some indication that there may be pre-merger expansions was already observ-
able in Figure 2, where merged municipalities witnessed a fairly steep initial increase in
expenditures in the early part of the merger.
To explore this issue explicitly, we estimate two types of models. First, we replicate
the previous regressions but include pre-merger dummies for voluntary and compulsory
mergers. The results are collected in Models (I) to (IV) of Table 5; they indicate that
there are indeed some pre-merger effects for compulsory mergers. Specifically, total,
administrative, and current expenditures are significantly higher one to two years before
a compulsory merger than in other years. For voluntary mergers, we do not observe
any common pool effects. Overall, these results are plausible as municipalities that were
merged forcibly should have had strong incentives to exploit the common pool and they
ostensibly did not want to be part of that common pool in the first place. In contrast,
municipalities that merged voluntarily chose their partners themselves, and thus excessive
34We have also explored whether the effect of mergers vary over time. These estimates, collected in
Table A.3 in the appendix, are mostly suggestive as the sample becomes increasingly unbalanced as we
move further in time. Nevertheless, these results indicate that the decline in administrative expenditures
remains constant over time. Similarly, compulsory mergers tend to have a reasonably large, but again
insignificant, effect on total and current expenditures for a few years after the completion of the merger.
In contrast, we do not observe significant effects on staff expenditures even in the long-run.
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exploitation of the common pool may have led to the cancellation of the merger and thus
would have been ultimately self-defeating.35 In any case, note that even if there are
common pool problems for compulsory mergers, we obtain negative coefficient estimates
for the post-merger dummy after explicitly accounting for the pre-merger effects in the
regressions for administrative expenditures. That is, there seem to be genuine cost savings
even as there was seemingly a deliberate increase in expenditures before compulsory
mergers. We also estimate negative effects for total and current expenditures, but these
estimates are smaller than in the baseline regressions once we include covariates.
Columns (V) to (VIII) of Table 5 reports results from an alternative approach to
account for pre-merger effects. Here, we simply drop all years after the start of the
merger reform and before the completion of the last merger within a municipality from
the sample (i. e. the sample only covers the periods 1995-2000 and 2005-2010). As the
merger reform was fairly unexpected, any incentives to exploit the common pool should
exist only in these few years. We observe that even without any observations from these
years, the negative treatment effect of compulsory mergers remains. The main difference
is that when we include control variables, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient in
the total and current expenditures regressions is somewhat smaller than previously.
6.5 Further heterogeneity across merger types
As the previous results indicate, voluntary and compulsory mergers have different ex-
penditure effects. However, mergers vary also along a number of further dimensions. In
this section, we explore these additional type of heterogeneity in mergers. The specific
questions we ask is whether voluntary and compulsory mergers are more effective (i) if
the total affected population is larger; (ii) if more municipalities participate in a merger;
and (iii) if a merger is an annexation rather than a fusion.
35However, Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2015) find that in Finland, pre-merger common pool effects exist
even for voluntary mergers.
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To explore these questions, we estimate variations of Equation 1 where we interact the
dummies for voluntary and compulsory mergers with variables that capture the above-
mentioned dimensions of heterogeneity in mergers. Specifically, Panel (A) in Table 6
reports results where we interact the merger dummies with the size of the population
of a post-merger municipality. We find that, in general, voluntary mergers are more ef-
fective in reducing costs when more inhabitants are involved. One exception, however,
seems to be staff expenditures, which increase with the size of the affected population.
For compulsory expenditures, we find generally no significant interactions; the exception
is current expenditures, which decline more in larger mergers. That there are generally
larger cost savings if more inhabitants are involved is, as discussed above, plausible as
the potential for cost savings is bigger.36 This may matter especially for municipalities
that merged voluntarily, as they already had relatively lower expenditures than compul-
sorily merged municipalities. The positive interaction between the size of the affected
population and voluntary mergers for staff expenditures is surprising, but may be again
explained by the duration of public sector employment contracts. Municipalities that
have more inhabitants also have more administrative staff, which are harder to cut even
in the medium run than other expenses.
Panel (B) reports results for models where we interact the merger dummies with the
number of participating municipalities. Here we find significant interactions for almost
all expenditure categories and for both voluntary and compulsory mergers. Specifically,
expenditures are generally lower for voluntary mergers when more municipalities par-
ticipate. The exception is again staff expenditures, which increase with the number of
municipalities. For compulsory mergers, we find that both total and current expenditures
decline more if a larger number of municipalities participate. These results are in line
with those for the interactions with population size, and can be rationalized accordingly.
Panel (C) estimate models where we differentiate between annexations and fusions.
To explore different fiscal effects of these two types of mergers, we interact the merger
36This also suggests that the municipalities involved are still below their optimal size for local service
provision.
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dummies with a dummy for annexations (thus fusions and mixed mergers are the ref-
erence category). We find mostly insignificant effects; however, the magnitude of the
interaction effects is fairly large. As the estimate is also typically negative, it seems that
annexations lead to more cost savings than the other type of mergers. Also, for adminis-
trative expenditures, the interaction effect is negative and significant, indicating that the
savings in administrative costs after compulsory mergers are mostly due to annexations.
One exception are again staff expenditures, which seem to increase more for voluntary
mergers that are annexations. As discussed above, one plausible explanation for why
annexations are more effective may be that it is relatively easy and straightforward to
cut non-staff related administrative expenditures in the municipalities that had been an-
nexed. The positive effect on staff expenditures is again surprising. It may be that in
an annexation, staff in the smaller partners has to be retained even if it is superfluous
due to the long-lasting employment contracts. In fusions, on the other hand, staff could
be shared and/or shifted across the (typically equally sized) merging municipalities to
enhance administrative efficiency.
6.6 Effects on revenues, fiscal pressure, and debt
If mergers affect expenditures, it seems likely that they should also have consequences on
other fiscal variables. Specifically, declining expenditures should be used by municipalities
to either reduce deficits and repay debt or to lower the fiscal burden on their citizens by
cutting taxes, user fees etc.37 In this section, therefore, we explore how the cost savings
that we identified for compulsory mergers affect the revenue side of the budget. Table 7
reports the results for total revenues, tax revenues, fiscal pressure (which is a proxy for
the fiscal stance of a municipality in the cameralistic accounting system)38, and for debt.
37Reingewertz (2012) explores effects on tax revenues to infer how administrative quality has evolved.
The idea is that tax revenues may decline due to evasion if the quality of the tax administration suffers
due to the expenditure cuts. In Germany, however, tax administration (even for local taxes) is under
the purview of the state governments.
38Primary surplus net of debt repayments and accrued liabilities.
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We observe statistically significant effects only for total expenditures. Specifically,
compulsory mergers lead to a reduction in total revenues by about 92 Euros per capita
when we omit covariates. With covariates, we observe an insignificant but still fairly
large reduction in total revenues by about 65 Euros per capita. We do not observe any
notable effects on tax revenues, fiscal pressure, and municipal debt. Overall, these results
suggest municipalities use the cost savings not to repay debt or to alleviate their fiscal
pressure. It seems that municipalities use the cost savings to reduce the fiscal burden on
their citizens. However, since we do not observe effects on tax revenues, municipalities
arguably cut non-tax revenue sources. For example, they may be levying lower user fees
or request fewer returns from municipal utilities, which would allow the latter to charge
lower fees to citizens.39
6.7 Discussion
To summarize, it seems that compulsory mergers reduce at least administrative and
possibly also total and current expenditures in the years following the merger, even as
municipalities subject to compulsory mergers seem to increase expenditures immediately
before the merger. Voluntary mergers, on the other hand, result in no cost savings, but
there is also no pre-merger increase in expenditures.
One reason why treatment effects are essentially zero for voluntary mergers might be,
as discussed above, that municipalities which merge voluntarily choose partners such that
they only barely fulfill the criteria set out by the state government regarding minimum
population of post-merger municipalities. Thus, municipalities that merged voluntarily
may still be too small to experience significant scale economies (See Table 2). Municipal-
ities that merge voluntarily may also have already cooperated in the pre-merger period
and thus have had lower expenditures.
39We attempted to explore whether any revenue categories witness a particularly large decline after
compulsory mergers, but did not find any strong evidence in this regard; it hence appears that munici-
palities spread the savings across a broad range of revenue sources.
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A further reason, not discussed above, may be that voluntarily merging municipalities
in Brandenburg are somewhat weaker fiscally. In 2000, average revenues per capita are
about 120 Euros per capita lower while grant receipts are about 20 Euros per capita
higher. These differences are statistically significant according to the t-tests reported
in Table 2. Municipalities marked for mergers might decide to merge early – and thus
voluntarily – because they are fiscally weaker than those who hang on until the end of the
reform period, when they were forced to merge. Another reason why observed economies
of scale are smaller could therefore be that municipalities that merged voluntarily are a
bad selection within the group of all merged municipalities.
However, while differences in population size or fiscal strength may be responsible for
why voluntary mergers seem to be ineffective, we can test whether any differences in such
municipal characteristics drive the results by explicitly including fiscal characteristics as
covariates in the regressions. However, the inclusion of such covariates does not substan-
tively affect the estimates for the merger dummies, diminishing the persuasiveness of this
argument.
Another possible reason for these results, also not explicitly discussed above, is that
municipalities that merged voluntarily received extra grants. If these grants were used
to expand expenditures and if these expenditures had persistent effects, we may obtain
estimates for voluntary mergers that are biased upwards. However, we control for these
grants in the regressions and find that their inclusion does not substantively change the
estimates. Moreover, these grants were only one-time payments, so their effects should
fade over time, and they were also not very large when compared to total expenditures.
Hence, the differences in the expenditure effects of compulsory and voluntary mergers
do not seem to be, at least not primarily, due to differences in municipal characteristics
or additional grant receipts by municipalities that merger voluntarily. Rather, the ability
to choose economically suboptimal partners and the possible existence of pre-merger
cooperation agreements seem to be more likely explanations for the relative ineffectiveness
of voluntary mergers (e.g. Weese (2015); Hyytinen et al. (2014)).
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7 Conclusion
This paper explores the impact of municipal mergers in the German federal state of
Brandenburg on municipal expenditure levels. Difference-in-difference estimations with
a panel of municipalities in Brandenburg for the years of 1995–2010 show that adminis-
trative expenditures decline after mergers. We also find reductions in total and current
expenditures, but these are typically statistically insignificant. The reductions are mainly
due to compulsory mergers; voluntary mergers do not lead to expenditure cuts. Besides
the voluntary vs. compulsory distinction, we also observe significant heterogeneity across
merger types. Mergers with a larger number of participants and those by annexations
seem to be more effective in reducing costs. The size of the affected population also
matters to some extent.
With respect to external validity, our results arguably carry over to other East-German
states given the similarities between them and Brandenburg. Despite socio-economic dif-
ferences between East and West Germany, our results should also be relevant for the
western states given that local budgeting and merger processes are quite similar.40 Inter-
national comparisons are more difficult as the organization of the subnational tier varies
significantly even among industrialized countries. However, that our results are in line
with the findings regarding the expenditure effects of compulsory mergers in Denmark
and Israel while our findings regarding voluntary mergers resemble those from Finland
and the Netherlands indicates that our results are relevant for industrialized countries as
well.
Overall, our findings suggest that policy makers should make further use of the instru-
ment of compulsory mergers to harvest scale effects and reduce especially administrative
costs. On the other hand, one should not neglect the non-monetary costs of mergers,
such as less local democracy and lower satisfaction of the local electorate (Lassen and
Serritzlew, 2011a,b; Hansen, 2015). Such political costs might be lower with voluntary
40Also, similar to the setting in Brandenburg, the West-German municipal mergers in the 1960s-1970s
were typically staggered and involved an initial (semi-) voluntary phase and a terminal compulsory phase
(Kauder, 2014).
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mergers as these likely result in less heterogeneous preferences within the merged munic-
ipalities and thus possibly lower voter frustration. Whether a specific type of merger is
on balance beneficial should, therefore, be decided on a case-by-case basis.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Min. Max. Obs.
Amalgamation overall 0.626 0.484 0.000 1.000 6249
between 0.484 0.000 1.000 409
within 0.000 0.626 0.626 15.279
Voluntary overall 0.394 0.489 0.000 1.000 6249
between 0.490 0.000 1.000 409
within 0.000 0.394 0.394 15.279
Compulsory overall 0.232 0.422 0.000 1.000 6249
between 0.423 0.000 1.000 409
within 0.000 0.232 0.232 15.279
Participants overall 3.051 3.810 0.000 22.000 6249
between 3.829 0.000 22.000 409
within 0.000 3.051 3.051 15.279
Annexation overall 0.232 0.422 0.000 1.000 6249
between 0.423 0.000 1.000 409
within 0.000 0.232 0.232 15.279
Total expenditures overall 1442.245 1088.088 535.547 37130.190 6249
between 644.282 816.951 10658.050 409
within 869.143 -8161.140 32091.010 15.279
Staff expenditures overall 217.839 150.980 0.000 781.692 6249
between 138.078 0.098 554.849 409
within 60.866 -59.501 758.569 15.279
Administrative expenditures overall 124.768 73.938 8.522 983.505 6249
between 55.501 24.965 381.866 409
within 49.143 -82.902 916.131 15.279
Current expenditures overall 1003.716 721.723 401.295 23439.870 6249
between 443.554 572.740 7049.120 409
within 563.875 -5207.385 20011.310 15.279
Total revenues overall 1301.559 731.057 -15.114 23642.040 6249
between 434.881 765.033 7104.007 409
within 583.295 -4784.032 21317.350 15.279
Tax revenues overall 292.269 605.804 -16677.210 18423.190 6249
between 308.661 137.371 5612.650 409
within 517.974 -17342.330 17758.060 15.279
Fiscal pressure overall -2.488 276.207 -9008.751 7019.375 6249
between 102.746 -1082.789 932.586 409
within 255.899 -8317.759 6084.301 15.279
Debt overall 719.163 860.308 0.362 14666.670 5609
between 765.406 11.648 8476.816 392
within 368.328 -3384.436 10863.360 14.309
Population overall 4991.444 7149.733 378.000 49371.000 6249
between 7168.267 413.667 43810.630 409
within 784.496 -5087.156 13770.380 15.279
Population density overall 109.217 218.630 8.000 2393.000 6249
between 216.722 8.905 2057.570 409
within 33.791 -683.805 699.195 15.279
Old overall 0.154 0.138 0.002 0.656 6249
between 0.133 0.005 0.559 409
within 0.037 -0.100 0.406 15.279
Grants overall 335.045 70.842 0.000 712.694 6249
between 51.944 52.700 429.285 409
within 48.245 -23.257 700.253 15.279
Income tax share overall 98.495 46.434 16.992 375.114 6249
between 20.956 56.097 171.366 409
within 41.398 -25.819 319.688 15.279
Amalgamation grants overall 2.511 16.014 0.000 167.439 6249
between 3.447 0.000 14.869 409
within 15.652 -12.358 158.788 15.279
Left overall 0.235 0.215 0.000 1.000 6249
between 0.198 0.000 0.930 409
within 0.083 -0.232 0.635 15.279
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